New information technologies can help unpack the relationships and tendencies that persist in complex networks. We present an interactive, web-based visualization that captures interlocking networks related to the Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) rebel group in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to demonstrate the utility of visually summarizing relationships in a multi-dimensional dataset. We draw exclusively from the findings the UN Group of Governmental Experts report S/2012/843 documenting the procurement of weapons and ammunition by the M23 network. The visualization was built using a hierarchical edge bundling algorithm (Holten 2006) implemented in Data-Driven Documents (d3) (Bostock 2011) , an open-source JavaScript-based library for interactive web visualizations. We contend that such visualizations can provide improved understanding of complex social networks both within and beyond the confines of war.
underway around the world. This is partly because it is exceedingly difficult to keep track of the many layers of the country's armed conflicts, not least the characteristics, dynamics and networks of armed groups such as the M23. A United Nations (UN) Group of Governmental Experts report S/2012/843 (2012) attempted to document the myriad ways in which entities such as M23 procured weapons and ammunition. And whilst heavily criticized by some governments in the region (especially Rwanda), they painstakingly assembled information and testimonies from hundreds of witnesses and secondary sources (Mancini 2013 ). Many of the findings and nuances of the report were lost on outsiders, owing to its complexity, density and length.
New information technologies can help unpack some of the relationships and tendencies that persist in complex networks. Indeed, one of the more interesting developments in the aid world is the rise of digital humanitarians, crisis mapping tools and large-scale event datasets that allow for useful ways of visualizing incident data. Following a cursory review of the DRC conflict, we present a web-based visualization of the M23 network, drawing exclusively from the findings in S/2012/843. The visualization was built by modifying existing, publicly-available code (Bostock 2011b; Bostock 2011c; Hartwick 2012) based on the hierarchical edge bundling algorithm (Holten 2006) implemented in Data-Driven Documents (d3) (Bostock 2011) , an opensource JavaScript-based library for interactive web visualizations.
The visualization algorithm identifies the optimal paths between connected nodes in hierarchical data and bundles them together along their joint paths. This is similar to the way in which electrical wires are bound together along the length of a wall until fanning out again to reach their individual destinations. In this way, connections between individuals at the lowest level are bundled together according to the parent nodes. It thus allows higher-level connections not directly visible in the data to be implicitly inferred, and reduces visual clutter in the graph. As a reader-driven tool, users can explore the data by interacting with selected elements, allowing for self-paced discovery. Importantly, the visualization can be used to render complex data more legible to policy makers, practitioners, researchers and lay-people.
We begin this commentary with a short overview of the DRC conflict, focusing in particular on the historical factors that gave rise to the M23. While familiar with the region, the authors are relying principally on data generated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts. The article then turns to the M23 specifically, followed by a discussion of the visualization tool and its functionalities. Names of individuals and armed groups in the text that also appear in the visualization are highlighted in bold text when first mentioned. This is intended to provide some additional context for readers to better navigate the tool. In the latter sections, the visualization is described in more detail -this includes background information on the underlying data, display features and ways of interacting with the application. We contend that such visualizations can provide insight into complex forms of data, both within and beyond the confines of war.
First Congo War (1996−1997)
As with so many wars, the trigger of DRC's armed conflicts can be traced outside the country. Specifically, the Rwandan genocide in 1994 precipitated an influx of over a million refugees and Hutu génocidaires across the border (Nzongola 2002: 224) . The RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) launched an offensive to counter the threats posed by the Hutu extremists, destroying refugee camps and rebel bases littering the border areas with DRC on 6 October 1996. 4 Violence intensified with the capture of the city of Uvira (South Kivu, (18) (19) (20) , likely by the Rwandan and Burundian armies (Turner 2007: 92) , and the creation of Laurent Kabila's AFDL (Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération), a coalition of four Congolese groups (18 October). The AFDL rebel movement, supported by Rwanda and Angola (Turner 2007: 5) , swept through South and North Kivu, ultimately deposing President Mobutu Sese Seko in Kinshasa on 17 May 1997 with Laurent Kabila declaring himself president of DRC.
During the AFDL advance in the Kivu provinces, the distribution of natural resources, previously controlled through local business channels, was appropriated by foreign power structures. This paved the way for systemic and spectacular exploitation (UN 2001, para. 23) . Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi used their support of Kabila and the AFDL as a way to establish territorial control (Nzongola 2002: 227) .
Second Congo War (1998−2002)
While the precise numbers are contested, the second Congo war killed an estimated 3.3 million people (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (IRC 2003) . It broke out as relations between Laurent Kabila and his Rwandan and Congolese Tutsi supporters deteriorated, triggering an invasion by Rwanda and Uganda (2 August 1998) and a failed march on Kinshasa (6 August-1 September). Meanwhile, the anti-Kabila RCD (Rassemblement congolais pour la démocra-tie) was formed by Congolese rebels in the city of Goma (North Kivu), but its lack of popular support prompted Uganda to sponsor the MLC (Mouvement pour la libération du congo) rebel group in November that same year (Nzongola 2002: 231) .
The war rapidly degenerated into partition, predation and plunder. Burundian, Rwandan, Ugandan and/or RCD soldiers extorted (September 1998-August 1999) (UN 2001, para. 32) and later extracted (UN 2001, para. 46) goods from occupied zones. Rwanda and Uganda were also accused of setting up front companies to facilitate illegal extraction activities (UN 2001, para. 79ff) . The UN and wider international community expanded their support during this period, ostensibly to promote more stability and reconstruction in the region.
An Unstable Decade (2003-2013)
After the formal end of war, the Kivus remained ' a slaughterhouse' (Prunier 2009: 281) due in large part to guerilla movements and various Mai Mai factions and their shifting alliances. The instability was also exacerbated by protracted conflict in the northeastern Ituri region, itself exacerbated by Uganda's desire to retain a foothold in the area (Prunier 2009: 281-282) . By December 2004, the UN force expanded from 10,800 to 16,000. Even after general elections in July 2006, the DRC was rife with armed groups: Mai Mai, Ugandan-backed Ituri warlords, foreign guerrilla groups such as the ADF (Allied Democratic Forces; Uganda), FNL (Forces nationales de libération; Burundi), and the FDLR (Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda), and troops loyal to Laurent Nkunda (Prunier 2009: 321-323) .
For his part, Nkunda was a former commanding officer of RCD in the city of Goma. At the end of 2006, he created the CNDP (Congrès national pour la défense du peuple), recruiting locally as well as in Rwanda and Burundi (Prunier 2009: 321-323) . Intense fighting escalated in North Kivu between Nkunda and the DRC armed forces, subsiding after Nkunda's capture in 2009. CNDP commander Bosco Ntaganda assumed control from Nkunda and was subsequently promoted to a senior position in the DRC army during its integration of CNDP forces.
The Rise and Fall of the M23
On 23 March 2009, the CNDP and the DRC government signed a peace agreement that granted the CNDP the status of a political party in exchange for the release of imprisoned members (AFP 2009). The peace process was, like many before it, short-lived. On 4 April 2012, the M23 rebel group -named after the date of the 2009 peace deal -was created after 300 mainly ex-CNDP soldiers mutinied against the DRC government, arguing that the government had failed to live up to the terms of the peace agreement and protesting the poor treatment in the DRC army (UN S/2012/843: 143 Annex 46). The M23 were to emerge as one of the most formidable armed groups in DRC.
The rapprochement between Kigali and Kinshasa encouraged the Rwandans to arrest Nkunda. This was purportedly in exchange for privileged command positions within the DRC army for the former CNDP rebels. But this also laid the groundwork for a return to war from a position of significant strength, since these ex-CNDP had access to weapons, minerals, and ties to other Congolese armed groups who had opposed their previous rebellion.
5 From the beginning, there was evidence that M23 was backed by extensive foreign support (UN 2012: 3; ICG 2012). The M23 rapidly expanded its control over Rutshuru territory that borders Uganda in North Kivu, and allegedly received direct military support and equipment from Rwanda, in violation of the arms embargo, as well as from Uganda (UN 2012: 3).
The precise composition of M23 was not entirely clear to outsiders. Many key figures in M23 are foreigners or maintain close ties with foreign powers. The M23 also established pacts with other armed groups in the Kivus, Ituri and Kasai-Occidental and carried out brutal attacks, executed prisoners of war, and recruited child soldiers (UN 2012: 3). The M23 movement reached its apex with the fall of the city of Goma on 20 November 2012.
After a rapid rise, the M23 experienced a similarly speedy demise, defeated on 5 November 2013 by the Congolese armed forces and a 3,000-strong UN brigade consisting of South African, Tanzanian and Malawian soldiers (Plett 2012). Moreover, M23 had been considerably weakened by internal leadership struggles between Ntaganda and Makenga (M23 military commander (UN 2012: 3)). On 15 March 2013, troops loyal to Makenga defeated Ntaganda's loyalists while Rwanda dismantled Ntaganda's network of support and recruitment in Rwanda (UN 2012: 4) . Ntaganda turned himself into the International Criminal Court in Rwanda and hundreds of his troops also crossed the border, where they were supposedly disarmed (UN 2103, para. 28). Meanwhile, Makenga struggled to rebuild the weakened M23.
The specific role of outside powers in shaping the fall of the M23 continues to be debated. Up until the final operations against the rebels in October 2013, M23 received RDF (Rwanda Defence Force) troop reinforcements, as the M23 reportedly became almost completely dependent on RDF troop support since the in-fighting in the top ranks (UN 2013a). There is widespread belief that increased international pressure on the Rwandan government contributed to reduced M23 support from within Rwanda (UN 2013a: 3). Even so, the UN Group of Experts reported (UN 2013a: 1) in December 2013 that a number of sanctioned M23 leaders continue to move freely in Uganda and the group continues to openly recruit members in Rwanda despite declaring an end to their rebellion on 5 November 2013. Also, numerous armed groups in the DRC continue to pose security threats, such as the FDLR and ADF, who are responsible for grave human rights violations and massive displacement (UN 2013b: 1).
How the Visualization Works Input data
The underlying information used for the visualization was extracted exclusively from the UN Group of Experts report S/2012/843. The UN report documents the Panel's investigation into the procurement of military equipment by armed groups in the DRC, their financial networks, and their involvement in the exploitation and trade of natural resources. Although criticized by some close to the Rwandan government 6 the Panel adhered to a strict methodology approved by the Security Council that relied heavily on first-hand witnesses to events, primarily excombatants; however, the reliability of the information presented in the UN report is dependent on the methods of those who collected the original data.
Specifically, the authors interviewed over a hundred former M23 members individually, including 57 who claimed to be Rwandan, and added personal testimonies. The collected data were subsequently triangulated with a larger network of over a hundred other sources, including eyewitnesses and others considered to be credible (local leaders, businessmen, border agents, peasants, ex-militia and active sources within the M23). In addition to interviews, tangible evidence was also sought, such as text messages, photos, receipts, communication records, and satellite images.
To build the input dataset for the visualization, individuals and/or groups associated with M23 or engaged in activity related to M23 operations as documented in the UN report were recorded in a spreadsheet. This spreadsheet includes rank (where applicable), affiliation ('M23,' 'Rwanda,' 'Uganda,' 'Burundi (Bur.),' 'Other armed groups in DRC,' or 'Individuals,') and a brief biography, along with a description of the interaction involving M23 and a list of individuals/ groups who were involved. Each individual/ group is a node in the dataset; the affiliations are parent nodes and are one level higher in the hierarchy. The spreadsheet was then converted into JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) files, a format that allows server to browser data transfer. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the visualization with a selected node (Ntaganda) highlighted. The nodes are grouped according to their affiliation and plotted on a circle in separate arcs, one for each of the six affiliations (black arc for M23 and gold arcs for 
The display

User interactivity
The data visualization is intended to be intuitive and user-friendly. It is also preliminary, with updates likely as data quality improves. Users can:
1. Hover over any node on the circle: doing so (i) displays the node's name and a brief biography at the top of the screen, (ii) indicates all the nodes connected to it by coloring the corresponding connecting lines in red, and (iii) enlarges the font size of the connected nodes; 2. Hover over any line connecting two nodes in the graph: doing so turns the line red and triggers the display of a brief synopsis at the top of the screen describing how the nodes are associated, i.e. the interaction(s) that connects the two nodes.
In these two ways, the user is free to explore the data in the visualization. For example, to find out more about the connection between Nkundizana and Bazanye in the visualization, the user hovers over the line connecting this node pair to reveal two interactions documented in the UN report: Also, for historical context, the user can use the visualization to discover the M23-related activities of the individuals or groups printed in bold text (when first mentioned) in the historical overview of the DRC conflict given above, since these names are nodes (i.e. ADF, FDLR, FNL, Kabarebe, Kayonga, M23, Mai Mai, Makenga, Nkunda, Ntaganda, RDF, RPF).
Applications and insights
The M23 data visualization is straight-forward and intuitive. It is obviously not exhaustive, drawing as it does on a report by the UN Group of Experts. But, it is illustrative of the extraordinary heterogeneity of such groups and their backers. As an analytical tool, the visualization provides a compelling snapshot of the complexity of the M23 and its relationship to key conflict actors. First, such information can assist conflict mediators, early warning specialists, and high-level decision-makers to acquire a rapid sense of the bigger picture. Second, the interactivity of the data visualization allows for data exploration that may reveal other (and potentially hidden or under-examined) dimensions in the conflict, and can be used to stimulate debate and reflection among the media, practitioners, civil society and scholars. Finally, the visual representation of hundreds of stories in a single connected graph can ensure that the DRC conflict
